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Divine Justice and the Library of Babel:
Or, Was Al Capone Really Punished for Tax
Evasion?
Gabriel S. Mendlow*
Abstract
A criminal defendant enjoys an array of legal rights. These include the
right not to be punished for an offense unless charged, tried, and proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the right not to be punished
disproportionately; and the right not to be punished for the same offense
more than once. I contend that the design of our criminal legal system
imperils these rights in ways few observers appreciate. Because criminal
codes describe misconduct imprecisely and prohibit more misconduct than
any legislature actually aspires to punish, prosecutors decide which
violations of the code merit punishment, and judges decide how much
punishment specific violations warrant. In making these decisions,
prosecutors and judges rely on evidence beside that which is necessary to
sustain a conviction, including evidence of an offender’s extraneous
transgressions. This practice calls into question whether offenders are
being punished for the offenses of which they’re formally convicted or
instead for the extraneous transgressions that inform the exercise of
official discretion. As I argue, theory and common sense alike suggest
that the offense an offender is punished for is determined less by the formal
features of the criminal process than by that process’s social meaning,
which itself is determined at least in part by the motivations of the
participating legal actors. Because we lack a sound basis to resolve these
matters, we may not know how often our legal system dishonors the rights
it proclaims sacrosanct.

*
Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I’m grateful to audiences at all the places where
I presented at least some of the material in this paper: Dartmouth, the Harvard/Yale/Stanford Junior
Faculty Forum, Hebrew University, Michigan, Northwestern, Tel Aviv University, UCLA, and York
University. Special thanks to Russell Christopher, Rich Friedman, Stephen Galoob, Sam Gross,
Monica Hakimi, Alon Harel, Scott Hershovitz, Don Herzog, Doug Husak, Dan Kahan, Joshua
Kleinfeld, Jae Lee, Kyle Logue, Bill Miller, Eric Miller, J.J. Prescott, Eve Primus, Richard Primus,
Don Regan, Adina Roskies, Scott Shapiro, Seana Shiffrin, Sonja Starr, Eric Swanson, and Peter
Westen.
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I.
A criminal defendant has the right not to be punished for an offense unless
charged, tried, and proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If convicted, he has
the right not to be punished disproportionately, or to be punished for the same
offense more than once. He also has the right not to be punished for his thoughts,
for his character, or for his race, ethnicity, or religion. I contend that the design of
our legal system imperils these rights in ways few observers appreciate.
Our system is a hybrid of two widely divergent ideal types. One is the Library
of Babel model,1 which employs a criminal code of infinitely fine texture, a code
that specifies with complete precision every conceivable wrong that a just state
would want to punish. The Code of Babel obviates the need for prosecutorial
discretion because every offense definition includes a description of the
circumstances that would warrant bringing a charge, as well as those that would
militate against it. Every offense definition in effect contains myriad “unless”
clauses describing circumstances that would negate the occurrence of a wrong worth
punishing. By design, these circumstances are the very ones that would lead a just
prosecutor not to bring charges in the exercise of her sound discretion. Thus, the
Code is crafted such that a prosecutor who pursues every provable violation will
bring no unwarranted charges. The Code of Babel also obviates the need for
sentencing discretion. Because the Code specifies every offense precisely—
incorporating within each offense definition every circumstance that might have a
just bearing on the sentence an offender should receive—the Code associates each
offense with a specific penalty.
The other ideal type of criminal legal system is the Divine Justice model, which
employs a criminal code of the coarsest texture and relies entirely on the discretion
of prosecutors and judges. The Code of Divine Justice contains but one offense: bad
conduct. Virtually every adult is guilty of this offense at one time or another, so
prosecutors must scan the populace and select the worst offenders for prosecution—
anyone who in some way merits state punishment. Unlike the provisions of the Code
of Babel, which identify and denounce perfectly-specified acts of wrongdoing, the
single offense set out in the Code of Divine Justice serves simply as an intake valve.
Its function is to bring persons before a court that acts as an arbiter of divine justice,
handing down sentences that impose punishment in one fell swoop for a lifetime of
transgressions, both discrete and episodic, as well as for bad character and bad
thoughts, all discounted by good deeds, lousy childhoods, and every other
conceivable mitigating factor.
Our criminal legal system resembles the Divine Justice model more closely
than we acknowledge and therefore imperils defendants’ rights more often than we
appreciate. Because our criminal codes describe misconduct imprecisely and
prohibit more misconduct than any legislature actually aspires to punish, prosecutors
See Jorge Luis Borges’ short story “La Biblioteca de Babel” (“The Library of Babel”) about
an infinite library containing every possible book.
1
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decide which violations of a code merit punishment, and judges decide how much
punishment specific violations warrant. In making these decisions, prosecutors and
judges rely on evidence beside that which is necessary to sustain a conviction,
including evidence of an offender’s extraneous transgressions. This practice calls
into question whether offenders are being punished for the offenses of which they’re
formally convicted or instead for the extraneous transgressions that inform the
exercise of official discretion.
As this essay argues, theory and common sense alike suggest that the offense
an offender is punished for is determined less by the formal features of the criminal
process than by that process’s social meaning, which itself is determined at least in
part by the motivations of the participating legal actors. Because we lack a sound
basis to resolve these matters, we may not know how often our legal system
dishonors the rights it proclaims sacrosanct. When we don’t know which offense an
offender is being punished for, we can’t know whether he is being punished
disproportionately, whether he is being punished more than once for the same
offense, whether the offense for which he is being punished is the offense of which
he was charged, tried, and proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether he
is being punished for his thoughts, for his character, or for his race, ethnicity, or
religion.
II.
Punishment by its nature takes an object.2 Actually, punishment takes two
objects: the transgression for which it’s imposed and the person on whom it’s
imposed. Punishment’s logical structure therefore mirrors that of its psychological
cousins, anger and resentment. In the prototypical case, you are resentful of some
person for some transgression (real or perceived). Often the transgression is
temporally bounded, being a discrete act or omission to act. But you can resent a
person for a series of misdeeds, or for a lifetime of inaction, or for a failure to love
or care or connect, or simply for being the kind of person she is. Even in the last
case, your resentment has two objects: the person and her transgression (namely,
being that kind of person). Resentment’s clearest counterpart—gratitude—also
takes two objects: in the prototypical case, you are grateful to a person for some
good deed. 3 So too does punishment’s clearest counterpart: the practice of
bestowing prizes or awards. Prizes always are bestowed on someone for something,
even when the thing they’re bestowed for is as diffuse and unbounded as a lifetime
of achievement.
2

See Gabriel S. Mendlow, The Elusive Object of Punishment, LEGAL THEORY (Forthcoming

2019).
3

Other attitudes have a simpler logical structure. Love and hatred, affection and dislike—
these attitudes prototypically take a single object: a person or other entity. Attitudes like happiness and
sadness may take no object at all. You might just be happy or sad, but not about anything in particular.
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The logical structure of punishment, like that of any social institution, is a
human artefact and therefore impermanent. If we wanted to, we could discard
punishment in favor of an outwardly similar institution that does nothing but
incapacitate the dangerous. The institution would mete out treatment with the look
and feel of punishment but with a different logical structure, being imposed for the
sake of future consequences rather than for past transgressions. Some theorists
would like to see an institution of this sort supplant legal punishment, 4 and many
officials have sought unabashedly to administer our existing penal institutions so as
to achieve preventive ends. Yet they’ve done so almost always without betraying
punishment’s logical structure: they’ve pursued preventive ends by punishing
offenders for supposed transgressions. The internal logic of punishment has held
firm. Even if punishment is often imposed for the sake of future consequences, it’s
always imposed for past transgressions. 5
But for which transgressions? Since the publication of George Fletcher’s 1994
essay “What Is Punishment Imposed For?,”6 virtually no English-language
scholarship has addressed Fletcher’s titular question7—possibly because no scholar
has seen reason to dissent from Fletcher’s anodyne answer: “[Punishment] is
imposed for the act of wrongdoing, the unjustified violation of a statutory norm.”8
This conception of the object of punishment might appear unassailable, as it seems
to follow from an incontrovertible proposition of criminal justice: that a person may
be punished only if proved guilty of violating a criminal statute. From this banal
truth, it seems to follow that violating a statute is what an offender is punished for.
But this way of thinking is fallacious, because it neglects at least two important
sources of uncertainty about what an offender’s punishment is being imposed for:
the discretion to charge and the discretion to sentence. Both sorts of discretion create
the possibility that a given offender is being punished for something other than, or
something in addition to, his “unjustified violation of a statutory norm.”
In what follows, I’ll focus at first on the discretion to charge. Once the relevant
concerns are in view, it won’t take long to raise similar concerns, perhaps even
graver ones, about the discretion to sentence. The basic problem is this: just as I
might purport to resent you for one transgression while actually (if obliquely)
4
See, e.g., BARBARA WOOTTON, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PATHOLOGY (George Allen &
Unwin Ltd., 1st ed.1959).
5
John Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 LAW &
PHIL. 1, 7 (2011) (“[A]nyone who begins their evening out by saying ‘let’s punish some people tonight’
is making no sense until we get an answer to the question ‘Punish them for what? What are they
supposed to have done?’”).
6

George P. Fletcher, What is Punishment Imposed For?, 1994 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 101.

I’m aware of but one publication on Fletcher’s question: Douglas Husak’s short essay, The
Importance of Asking the Right Question: What is Punishment Imposed For?, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
GEORGE FLETCHER (Russell Christopher ed., 2012).
7

8

Fletcher, supra note 6, at 105 (emphasis added).
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expressing resentment for another, so might the state purport to punish an offender
for his nominal offense of conviction while actually censuring and sanctioning him
for something else.
III.
Because our criminal codes are coarse-grained, not every instance of every
offense can or ought to be prosecuted. Because not every instance of every offense
can or ought to be prosecuted, prosecutors must exercise discretion in selecting
whom to charge for what. Because they exercise such discretion abundantly, the
offense of which a defendant formally stands charged may give a false impression
of why the state has targeted him for prosecution. In many instances, the formal
charge simply is the most substantial crime the state thinks it can prove. The state’s
true reason for targeting the defendant is that it suspects him of a more serious
offense.9 This prosecutorial model—classic pretextual prosecution—represents
one, but only one, scenario in which the state’s reason for prosecuting a defendant
is something other than a desire to see him brought to justice on the formal charge.
A second is where the state’s objective is to incapacitate the defendant by hook
or by crook, not because it suspects him of a crime it can’t prove but because it
thinks he’s extremely dangerous. This prosecutorial model is a mainstay of federal
criminal prosecution, receiving official sanction not only from the culture 10 and
policy11 of the Department of Justice but also from Congress, through statutes like
the Armed Career Criminal Act.12 This statute mandates a prison sentence of at least
fifteen years for anyone caught possessing a gun after sustaining three convictions
for a violent felony or a serious drug offense. 13 In promulgating the Armed Career
Criminal Act, Congress made no claim that fifteen years in prison for gun possession
was a punishment warranted by considerations of desert alone. The avowed

9
See generally Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135 (2004); Daniel C.
Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual
Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 639 (2005).
10
See Litman, supra note 9, at 1135–36 (“Federal prosecutors take for granted that it is
appropriate to prosecute those offenders whose cases will provide important collateral benefits, such
as the incapacitation of a repeat violent offender.”).

Consider the Department of Justice’s Project Safe Neighborhoods and its predecessor,
Project Triggerlock, both of which aim for the longest possible sentences for certain criminals with
guns. See Bonita R. Gardner, Separate and Unequal: Federal Tough-on-Guns Program Targets
Minority Communities for Selective Enforcement, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 305, 307 (2007).
11

12

Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2018).

13

Id.
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Congressional purpose was to give prosecutors a tool by which to incapacitate repeat
offenders.14
A third situation in which the formal charge against a defendant may give a
false impression of the state’s reason for prosecuting him is where the state’s true
motivation is antipathy to the defendant’s beliefs or desires. This scenario often
coincides in practice with the second, because a common reason for the state’s
antipathy to a defendant’s beliefs and desires is the perception that these mental
states bespeak dangerousness.
Like the first model, the second and third prosecutorial models are in a sense
pretextual, the formal charge serving as a pretext for a law enforcement maneuver
carried out on an ulterior ground. All three models accordingly raise questions about
what the defendant is really being punished for. Is it for the charged offense? Or is
it instead for the ulterior ground—for the more serious crime of which the defendant
is suspected, for the defendant’s perceived dangerousness, or for the defendant’s
thoughts? I’ll focus on pretextual prosecutions grounded in a defendant’s
thoughts,15 mindful of the fact that similar concerns could be raised about any
ulterior ground for prosecution.
If the state prosecutes a defendant for spitting on the sidewalk but wouldn’t
have prosecuted him at all if it hadn’t disliked his thoughts, are these thoughts what
the defendant is really being punished for? Questions like this one arise often in
connection with the fight against terrorism, where the suspicion that a defendant has
been targeted primarily because of his thoughts may stem from multiple sources—
including the government’s official policy of prosecuting terrorists pretextually, 16 its
apparent tendency to view extremist religious speech as a proxy for terroristic

14

See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 1 (1984) (stating that the purpose of the Armed Career
Criminal Act is “to increase the participation of the [f]ederal [l]aw enforcement system in efforts to
curb armed, habitual (career) criminals.”). See also James G. Levine, The Armed Career Criminal Act
and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 545–48
(2009).
15
In what follows, I assume that it’s wrong to punish a person for his thoughts, although I don’t
think anyone has provided a fully satisfactory account of why that is. See Gabriel S. Mendlow, Why Is
It Wrong To Punish Thought?, 127 YALE L.J. 2342 (2018).
16
See Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks for the US Mayors Conference (Oct.
25, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks10_25.htm (“Robert
Kennedy’s Justice Department, it is said, would arrest mobsters for ‘spitting on the sidewalk’ if it would
help in the battle against organized crime. It has been and will be the policy of this Department of
Justice to use the same aggressive arrest and detention tactics in the war on terror.”); Jeff Breinholt,
Seeking Synchronicity: Thoughts on the Role of Domestic Law Enforcement in Counterterrorism, 21
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 157 (2005) (defending pretextual prosecution as a method of incapacitating
terrorists).
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intent,17 and its apparent willingness to launch terrorism investigations seemingly on
the basis of subjects’ religion alone. 18
The suspicion that the government has targeted a defendant because of his
thoughts can linger even after the government has proved that the defendant engaged
in genuinely disturbing conduct. A case in point is the prosecution of Hamid Hayat,
an American citizen of Pakistani descent, who stood trial in April 2006 on charges
of providing material support to terrorists.19 The government accused Hayat of
traveling from his home in California to a jihadi training camp in Pakistan and then
coming back to California about a month later with the intention of committing an
act of terrorism. 20 When interrogated by the FBI, Hayat at first denied any
connection to terrorism. After many hours of questioning, he conceded in the
vaguest of terms that he might have been awaiting orders to launch an attack. 21
17
See Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic Counterterrorism,
89 TEX. L. REV. 833, 845 (2011) (discussing government’s treatment of religious speech as a “signal
of criminal intent”).
18

Matt Apuzzo & Joseph Goldstein, New York Drops Unit That Spied On Muslims, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 2014, at A1 (describing New York Police Department’s decision to “abandon[] a secretive
program [called the Demographics Unit] that dispatched plainclothes detectives into Muslim
neighborhoods to eavesdrop on conversations and built detailed files on where people ate, prayed and
shopped . . . .”).
19

Rone Tempest, In Lodi Terror Case, Intent Was the Clincher, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2006, at

B1.
20

See Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Hayat, No. 2:05-CR-00240-GEB, at 2–
4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2006).
21
From two news reports, Professor Robert Chesney compiled the following exchange between
Hamid Hayat and an FBI interrogator trying to determine whether Hayat was involved in a terrorist
plot:
“FBI: So jihad means that you fight and you assault something?
Hamid: Uh-huh.
FBI: Give me an example of a target. A building?
Hamid: I’ll say no buildings. I’ll say people.
FBI: OK, people. Yeah. Fair enough. People in buildings . . . I’m trying to get details
about plans over here.
Hamid: They didn’t give us no plans.
FBI: Did they give you money?
Hamid: No money.
FBI: Guns?
Hamid: No.
FBI: Targets in the U.S.?
Hamid: You mean like buildings?
FBI: Yeah, buildings. . . . Sacramento or San Francisco?
Hamid: I’ll say Los Angeles and San Francisco.
FBI: Financial, commercial?
Hamid: I’ll say finance and things like that.
FBI: Hospitals?
Hamid: Maybe, I’m sure. Stores.
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Further investigation uncovered no evidence of any actual terror plot, but it did
reveal facts that shed an eerie light on Hayat’s mind: he admired the murder and
beheading of Israeli-American journalist Daniel Pearl,22 he kept a scrapbook of
articles about extremist Pakistani political parties, and he carried an Arabic prayer
in his wallet that said, “Oh Allah, we place you at their throats, and we seek refuge
in you from their evil.”23 The prosecutor emphasized these facts at Hayat’s trial,
urging the jury not to forget Hayat’s “jihadi heart” and “jihadi mind.” 24
After the jury found Hayat guilty, a reporter asked the U.S. attorney a pointed
question: had the case against Hayat partaken of the methods used by the thought
police in Philip K. Dick’s short story “The Minority Report,” where the police
indefinitely detained would-be criminals based solely on information about their
unexecuted criminal intentions?25 The U.S. attorney rejected the comparison, saying
that the government had prosecuted Hayat not for “what he thought” but for what he
did, namely, “the overt physical act of attending a training camp and returning to
commit jihad.”26 This answer did little to assuage the critics of Hayat’s prosecution.
Suspecting that the government had gone after Hayat more for his “jihadi heart” and
“jihadi mind” than for his ambiguous actions,27 critics vehemently accused the
FBI: What kind of stores?
Hamid: Food stores.”
Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated
Terrorism, 80 S. CALIF. L. REV. 425, 489 (2007) (compiling the exchange from two sources: Mark
Arax, The Agent Who Might Have Saved Hamid Hayat, L.A. TIMES MAG., May 28, 2006, and Tempest,
supra note 19).
To an FBI informant whom Hayat thought was his best friend, Hayat said, “They killed him
[Daniel Pearl]. So, I’m pleased about that. They cut him into pieces and sent him back. That was a
good job they did. Now they can’t send one Jewish person to Pakistan.” Arax, supra note 21, at 16.
22

23

Tempest, supra note 19.

24

Id.

25
Id. See Philip K. Dick, The Minority Report, in THE MINORITY REPORT AND OTHER CLASSIC
STORIES 71 (2002).
26
27

Tempest, supra note 19.

See Punished for a Thought: Law Perverts Justice with Charges for Acts, DAYTONA BEACH
NEWS-J OURNAL, Aug. 2, 2007, at 04A (“The government is arresting individuals on terrorism charges
based on what individuals have said or thought—not on actual, concrete plans.”); Glenn Greenwald,
The FBI’s Anticipatory Prosecution of Muslims to Criminalize Speech, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 19, 2013,
(quoting Professor Shirin Sinnar as saying that Hayat’s case “rais[es] the haunting prospect that a man
who had done nothing was convicted for a violent state of mind.”); Eric Umansky, Department of PreCrime: Why Are Citizens Being Locked Up for “Un-American” Thoughts?, MOTHER J ONES, Feb. 29,
2008 (asserting that Hayat effectively was charged with having a “jihadi mind”); Cf. Peter W.
Beauchamp, Misinterpreted Justice: Problems with the Use of Islamic Legal Experts in U.S. Trial
Courts, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1097, 1106 (2011) (implying that defendants like Hamid Hayat are
“prosecut[ed] . . . on the basis of what they or their support may someday accomplish, rather than for
what has already been done.”).
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government of punishing Hayat for thinking bad thoughts28 and for having a “violent
state of mind.”29
Because Hayat nevertheless had performed actions that a reasonable observer
could characterize as furthering the cause of jihad, the government plausibly could
claim that its motivation really was to bring Hayat to justice for the crime of which
he was formally charged—placing himself at the disposal of a terrorist
organization30—rather than to punish Hayat for his beliefs and desires. With other
terrorism prosecutions, however, we may have a harder time excluding the
possibility that the government has gone after the defendant primarily because of his
beliefs and desires. Often the charged offense bears no connection to terrorism. 31
As the Chief of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division explained in
Congressional testimony,
[t]here are a number of terrorism investigations where the decision . . .
made at the charging stage [is] to charge the defendant with a nonterrorism crime in order to protect . . . national security and classified
information that may be exposed, sources and methods and that sort of
thing, that may be jeopardized by the criminal discovery that would ensue
if we were to charge [the defendant with a] terrorism offense. 32
As a result of charging decisions made in secret, sometimes no one but the
prosecutor knows that the government is going after the defendant because he’s
suspected of being a terrorist or terrorist sympathizer—not the jury, not the judge,
not even the defendant himself.33
28

Umansky, supra note 27.

29

Greenwald, supra note 27 (quoting Professor Shirin Sinnar).

30
See United States v. Hayat, 710 F.3d 875, 883 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The statute [under which
Hayat was charged, namely, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (providing material support to a terrorist
organization),] defines ‘material support or resources’ as [inter alia] ‘any . . . personnel (1 or more
individuals who may be or include oneself). . . . The prosecution’s case was that Hayat had provided
his personal services to a terrorist organization by attending the training camps in Pakistan and
returning with the intent to carry out acts of terrorism when directed to do so.”).
31
Todd Lochner, Sound and Fury: Pretextual Prosecution and Department of Justice
Antiterrorism Efforts, 30 LAW & POL’Y 168, 185 (2008) (claiming that “the crimes most commonly
associated with pretextual antiterrorism prosecutions [are] immigration, false statements, fraud, and
counterfeiting violations . . . .”).
32

Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, supra note 9, at 621 (quoting Criminal Terrorism
Investigations and Prosecutions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Oct. 21, 2003,
(testimony of Christopher Wray), LEXIS, Federal News Service Transcript).
33
In 2008, I heard federal judge Kenneth M. Karas (formerly an anti-terrorism prosecutor in
the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York) tell an audience at Yale
Law School that his old office routinely prosecuted suspected Hezbollah operatives for low-level
infractions in order to procure their deportation—these defendants being oblivious to the fact that the
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Utterly in the dark about the number and nature of these cases, we can only
guess how many terrorism prosecutions are motivated by the government’s
antipathy to—or, more exactly, its fear of—the defendant’s beliefs and desires,
rather than by intelligence about incipient terror plots. The number of these
prosecutions almost certainly is greater than zero, given the apparent frequency with
which the government bases antiterrorism investigations and prosecutions on
subjects’ religious speech.34 In all probability, the government sometimes
prosecutes a defendant at least in part because of his “jihadi mind.” Does it follow
that the crime of which the defendant is formally charged and convicted isn’t really
what he’s being punished for—that what he’s really being punished for is having a
“jihadi mind”? (Again, we could ask a similar question about any ulterior ground
for prosecution.)
A formalistic answer (if true) would resolve all uncertainty about the object of
a defendant’s punishment and remove any doubt about whether the defendant is
being punished improperly. That a defendant is prosecuted and punished because
of his thoughts, a formalist will insist, does not entail that he is punished for his
thoughts. Legal punishment is a condemnatory sanction imposed by the state upon
a supposed offender for an offense,35 and that offense (the formalist will say) is none
other than the offense of which the defendant is formally charged and convicted.
That offense is the offense the state publicly accuses the defendant of having
committed, the offense governing the nature and scope of the evidence that the
prosecution presents at the defendant’s trial, the offense that the jury must conclude
the defendant committed before the state may punish him, the offense determining
the range of possible sentences, and the offense for which the court publicly claims
to be punishing the defendant when it sentences him. The formalist will insist that it
is these features of a prosecution—not the state’s ulterior motivation for initiating
it—that determine which wrong the defendant is really being punished for.
government was going after them because it suspected they were terrorists. See also Richman & Stuntz,
supra note 9, at 639; Lochner, supra note 31, at 168 (“One federal district court judge [in Iowa] claimed
that ‘if there have been terrorism-related arrests in Iowa, I haven’t heard about them’ even though he
presided over six of the criminal cases that the Department [of Justice] had catalogued as terrorism
convictions.”).
34
See Huq, supra note 17, at 845 (“The incidence of religious speech at the prosecution stage
as a signal of criminal intent is suggestive of a greater reliance on the same kind of evidence upstream—
in investigations. Even setting aside those investigations that do not end in charges, many terrorism
investigations (perhaps a majority) end in ‘pretextual’ charges, from wire fraud to immigration crimes.
Such charges are unconnected with terrorism but form the possible basis for a less costly type of
punitive action. In those cases, the state’s upstream reliance on religious speech for singling out a
suspect is never revealed. At the very least, therefore, any estimation of the use of religious speech as
a signal in counterterrorism that relies on reported trials is likely to yield an undercount, and probably
a substantial one.”); Apuzzo & Goldstein, supra note 18.
35
See H. L. A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT
RESPONSIBILITY : ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 4–5 (2d ed. 2008).

AND
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If the formalist is right, then even Al Capone, the most famous subject of
pretextual prosecution in American history, really was punished for the crime of
which he was formally charged and convicted—tax evasion—rather than for the
more serious crimes that the government openly ascribed to him and that lay behind
its decision to prosecute him in the first place. Tax evasion was the crime of which
Capone was publicly accused, the crime of which the government presented
evidence at his trial, the crime of which the jury found him guilty, and the crime for
which the court claimed to be punishing him when it sentenced him to eleven years
in prison.36
If the formalist is correct—if Capone was punished for tax evasion and not, say,
for the Saint Valentine’s Day Massacre—then Hamid Hayat was punished for
providing material support to terrorists and not for his jihadi heart and mind; indeed,
all defendants are punished for the crimes of which they’re formally charged and
convicted and not for the activities or characteristics that might have kindled the
government’s interest in prosecuting them.
If these claims come off as unsophisticated or naïve, the formalist might defend
them by insisting there is no viable alternative. What is an offender really punished
for, if not for the offense of conviction? For whatever made the prosecutor want to
prosecute him? Why not for whatever made the police want to arrest him? Or
whatever made the jury want to convict him? Or whatever made the judge want to
sentence him? And when the motives of these actors diverge, as they frequently do,
whose motive determines what the offender is really being punished for? How often
can we know the true motives of these actors anyway? If only rarely—so the
formalist will continue in a mocking tone—then only rarely can we know what an
offender is really being punished for, and only rarely can we determine whether an
offender’s sentence is truly proportionate to his offense, or whether that offense is
something the state is permitted to punish in the first place.
To follow the formalist this far, we must accept that the motivations of the
participants in the criminal process play no role whatever in fixing the object of an
offender’s punishment. Should we accept this? The formalist’s rhetorical questions
suggest that, if the motivations of the participants determined (or helped determine)
what an offender is being punished for, then our ability to know whether an offender
is being punished justly could be as limited as our ability to see inside the
participants’ heads, which is to say, very limited indeed. But this isn’t a
demonstration that formalism is true; it’s a description of the widespread uncertainty
we’d face if formalism were false. As I’ll presently explain, we may have good
reason to conclude that it is.

36
LAURENCE BERGREEN, CAPONE : THE MAN
prosecution of Al Capone).
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The root of the problem is that legal punishment is an act of collective
expression37 and its object is therefore a function of its social meaning. Just as a
person can purport to express disapproval of one thing (by saying certain words)
while actually expressing disapproval of another (with a wink and a nod, or a smirk
and a shrug), so might the state purport to disapprove of one wrong while actually
disapproving of another. The Soviet show trials of the 1930s seem a clear example
of the phenomenon, perhaps more so than the prosecution of Al Capone. When the
motivations of the participants diverge grossly from the participants’ formal account
of what they’re up to, it’s hard to deny that the participants are up to something other
than what they say they are.
How gross must the divergence be in order for us to conclude that the defendant
in a criminal case is being punished for something other than the nominal offense of
conviction? If we don’t know where to draw the line, then we ought to consider that
we often may not know what offenders are being punished for. And if we often
don’t know what offenders are being punished for, then we don’t know how often
they’re being punished disproportionately, how often they’re being punished for an
offense the law may not punish, and how often they’re being punished in
contravention of due process.
IV.
In a moment, I’ll elucidate and deepen these uncertainties using principles of
philosophy of language. But first I want to show that similar uncertainties—perhaps
greater ones—arise from a court’s discretion to sentence.
Because our criminal codes are coarse-grained, not every instance of a given
offense merits the same punishment. Some burglaries, assaults, and kidnappings are
worse than others. That’s why the law authorizes a court to exercise discretion when
it fashions a sentence. 38 To exercise its discretion rationally, a court must consider
all relevant evidence—and the range of potentially relevant evidence is vast. It
includes at least the following: evidence of details about the crime besides those
needed to sustain a conviction; evidence of actions the defendant performed in
preparation for the crime; evidence of actions the defendant performed to avoid
detection afterward; evidence of related but distinct transgressions; and, of course,
37

JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS
THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98 (1970) (“[P]unishment is a conventional device for the
expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation,
on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is
inflicted.”).
IN THE

See John Gardner, Wrongs and Faults, 59 REV. METAPHYSICS 95, 122 (2005) (“The Rule of
Law, by insisting on clarity, stability, prospectivity, and so on, often prevents the law from showing
full sensitivity to the differential moral merits of every wrong that is committed and every credible
justification or excuse for its commission. Some questions bearing on fault, normally but not always
relating to the fine-tuning of fault. . . are inevitably left over to be dealt with at the sentencing stage.”).
38
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evidence of the defendant’s prior misconduct.39 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
direct courts to sentence defendants on the basis of all “relevant conduct,”40 a
category encompassing a wide range of uncharged misdeeds, 41 even including
misdeeds of which the defendant has been acquitted. 42 Most state judges enjoy
comparable discretion, sentencing offenders based on their uncharged offenses,
history, and other personal characteristics. 43
Now it’s often entirely appropriate for a judge to consider these facts at a
defendant’s sentencing hearing. As Julie O’Sullivan observes, “[i]nformation about
the true scope of the defendant’s and his accomplices’ related criminal activity
informs our assessment of the defendant’s just deserts for the offense of conviction
in so far as it illuminates the defendant’s motivation and purposefulness in engaging
in this criminal act.”44 Because a defendant’s “motivation and purposefulness” may
make his offense of conviction a worse offense—one meriting harsher
punishment—the fact that a defendant’s motivation increases his sentence doesn’t
necessarily mean that what he’s really being punished for is his motivation in itself,
a mental transgression distinct from the offense of conviction.

39
See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244–45 (1949) (“Within limits fixed by
statutes, New York judges are given a broad discretion to decide the type and extent of punishment for
convicted defendants. . . . To aid a judge in exercising this discretion intelligently the New York
procedural policy encourages him to consider information about the convicted person’s past life, health,
habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities.”).
40
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL § 1B1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) (Relevant
Conduct). See United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 419 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“In
promulgating the relevant conduct guideline [§ 1B1.3], the Commission adopted a so-called ‘real
offense’ philosophy, since section 1B1.3 calls for sentencing based upon the actual conduct engaged
in, rather than only upon the offense for which the defendant was convicted. . . . To this end, subsection
(a)(2) of the relevant conduct guideline requires courts, in determining an offender’s base offense level,
to include ‘all such acts and omissions that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme
or plan as the offense of conviction.’” (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(2))).

See, e.g., Galloway, 976 F.2d at 414 (upholding defendant’s sentence on one count of theft
from interstate shipment of goods where sentence was based on eight separate thefts, including seven
that were not charged).
41

42
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (holding that “a jury’s verdict of acquittal
does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so
long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
43

See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 523, 528 (1993) (“Nearly every state allows sentencing courts to engage freely in real-offense
sentencing as a matter of discretion”); id. at 528 n.22 (collecting cases in support of same); id. at 534
(“Nearly all jurisdictions allow courts to consider . . . nonconviction charges when sentencing.”); id. at
534 n.70 (collecting cases in support of same).
44
Julie R. O’Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ Modified Real-Offense
System, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1342, 1370 (1997).
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Still, whenever a sentencing court considers non-offense evidence, it’s natural
for us to wonder whether the court really is punishing the defendant just for the
offense of conviction—as the law requires—or is punishing the offender instead (or
in addition) for the other transgressions that the non-offense evidence may reveal.
This is a question we need to be able to answer: if the true object of an offender’s
punishment is something other than the offense of conviction, then the offender is
being punished in contravention of a supposed precept of our legal system: that no
one may be punished for an offense unless charged, tried, and proved guilty of that
offense.45
A striking illustration of this possibility is the case of Dennis Hastert, a former
speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives convicted of “currency structuring.”
(The crime of currency structuring involves breaking up a banking transaction into
amounts less than $10,000 in order to avoid triggering the bank’s duty to file a
report.) Investigators examining Hastert’s suspicious banking practices discovered
not only that he’d been engaging in currency structuring but that he’d been doing it
with a disturbing motive: to conceal the fact that he was buying the silence of a man
he’d sexually abused as a boy decades earlier. Investigators eventually learned that
Hastert had abused at least three other boys while serving as their high school
wrestling coach. All of this abuse factored into Hastert’s ultimate sentence for
currency structuring. The sentencing judge offered this comment:
Had this [sexual abuse] been uncovered near the time when it occurred, a
grand jury . . . would have indicted you, a jury likely would have convicted
you, and you likely would have been sentenced to decades in a state prison.
. . . But because the statute of limitations for your child molestation ran
out many years ago, you can’t be charged for that. And I can’t sentence
you as a child molester. It’s not what you were charged with, it’s not what
you’ve pled guilty to, and any sentence I give you today will pale in
comparison to what you would have faced in state court. But this conduct
is relevant to your history and characteristics no matter how old it is. Some
conduct is unforgivable no matter how old it is. If the juvenile victim of
sex abuse can’t forget decades later what happened, then neither can I as
a judge nor can we as a society. The abuse was 40 years ago, but the
damage lasts today. . . . My sentence today can’t legally or properly be a
sentence for child molestation, and I don’t want it in any way to be
perceived that the sentence here measures the harm caused by the child
molestation. In the end, that would have to be a state court judge
A large part of what gives point and urgency to the question of whether “repeat offenders
[are] more culpable than first-time offenders” is our need to assure ourselves that recidivist sentencing
practices don’t amount to punishing recidivists more than once for the same offense. Youngjae Lee,
Repeat Offenders and the Question of Desert, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL
AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 49 (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010).
45
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sentencing you for a conviction of child molestation, and the sentence in
this case can never be as long as the time the victims and their families
have suffered. 46
Although the judge acknowledged that Hastert’s sentence “[couldn’t] legally or
properly be a sentence for child molestation,” Hastert’s child molestation was the
focal point of the sentencing hearing. The judge questioned Hastert about each of
the four men he’d abused as boys, rather than just about the man whose victimization
Hastert had tried to conceal. The judge allowed testimony from one of Hastert’s
victims and also from the sister of another victim who had died of AIDS two decades
earlier. The judge then imposed a sentence of fifteen months—two-and-a-half times
the maximum recommended by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Commenting
on the sentence, a former federal prosecutor said, “It’s extraordinary that the case
was on its face a cut-and-dry financial structuring case . . . but the sentencing
[hearing] was about everything, essentially, but the structuring.” 47
None of this was improper per se. Not every fact that increases an offender’s
sentence necessarily forms part of the object of the offender’s punishment: to punish
Hastert in the light of his child molestation wasn’t necessarily to punish him for it.
If Hastert’s currency structuring truly warranted a sentence two-and-a-half times the
recommended maximum because of his illicit motive, then the judge was right to
consider the child molestation at the sentencing hearing.
But the hearing itself told a different story. Much of the child molestation
recounted at the hearing wasn’t molestation that Hastert had intended his currency
structuring to conceal. The judge evidently believed that if he said he was punishing
Hastert for currency structuring and not for child abuse, then that’s really what he
was doing. But why should we accept what the judge said? Why should we accept
that a judge is doing whatever he says he’s doing, and not anything else (or anything
more)?
Generally, we don’t believe that an entity’s self-description determines the
proper characterization of its conduct. Suppose Country A bans the import of meat
from Country B after Country B launches a cyber-attack on Country A. Country A
claims that the import ban is motivated by a concern for food safety, when in fact
it’s motivated by a desire to retaliate against Country B for the cyber-attack. Does
it follow that the import ban isn’t in fact an act of retaliation? Is the import ban a
food-safety measure simply because that’s what Country A calls it? If that were
true, clandestine retaliation would be a conceptual impossibility. Often more
important than what a person or entity says they’re doing is what they think they’re
doing. If Country A thinks it’s engaged in retaliation—if it enacts an import-ban for
46

Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 67–68, United States v. Hastert, (No. 15 CR 315) (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 27, 2016).
47

Monica Davey, Julie Bosman & Mitch Smith, Dennis Hastert Sentenced to 15 Months, and
Apologizes for Sex Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2016.
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the purpose of getting back at Country B—that seems sufficient to make the import
ban an act of retaliation.
Why accept that punishment is different from geopolitical retaliation? Why
accept that, unlike an act of geopolitical retaliation, an act of punishment is the
precise act that it is (i.e., an act of punishment for x rather than an act of punishment
for y) simply because that’s what the punisher says? We lack any argument, let
alone a conclusive one, for this sort of formalistic, motivation-independent account
of the object of punishment.
For my part, I find it hard to imagine that the object of punishment isn’t fixed
at least some of the time by the motivations of the relevant legal actors. I don’t claim
that a prosecutor or judge’s motivations necessarily play a determinative role in
fixing the object of punishment. I claim merely that officials’ motivations probably
play at least a partial role. It’s consistent with this claim that Al Capone really was
punished for tax evasion. My point is that the question whether Capone was or
wasn’t punished for tax evasion is an open question. And that’s because the object
of an offender’s punishment is in part a function of his prosecution’s social meaning,
and that social meaning is in part a function of the participants’ motivations, rather
than solely a function of the prosecution’s formal features. That the formal features
all point in the same direction isn’t enough to render the question closed. If the
participants in Hastert’s case had each believed that they were censuring him for his
child molestation—if they’d had the child molestation foremost in their minds, if
they’d aimed to craft a punishment befitting it, and if they’d hoped he’d feel the
sting of his sentence as a just rebuke for what they saw as his true misdeed—I don’t
see how we could maintain with any confidence that Hastert was punished for
currency structuring and not for child molestation.
But if the participants’ beliefs and motivations help determine the object of
punishment in the not-so-extreme hypothetical circumstances I just described, then
why not in more moderate circumstances, too? The question, it seems, isn’t whether
participants’ mental states can determine the object of punishment—it’s when.
Legal punishment is a kind of collective expression, a kind of collective utterance.
As with all utterances, its meaning seems unlikely to be entirely independent of the
beliefs and intentions of the speaker.
Our (potential) ignorance about these matters is on two levels. One level is
practical: we may not know the specific facts (e.g., the specific collective intentions)
that determine the object of a particular offender’s punishment. The other is
theoretical: we may not know the more general type of facts that determine the object
of any offender’s punishment. In other words, we might not know what a given
offender is punished for because we don’t even know where to look for an answer.
We lack a consensus theory of the object of punishment. Indeed, we lack any theory
at all. The only thing beyond reasonable dispute is that punishment essentially
involves the censure of an offender for a supposed wrong.
We should start by asking what (or who) is the punitive agent, the agent that
does the censuring. I’ve referred to it as the state, but the state is an abstraction, not
a concrete actor. The state acts only through its officials. Is the punitive agent
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therefore some particular official—the sentencing judge, perhaps, or the prosecutor,
a more central figure in our system? Or is the punitive agent a collective agent—
the criminal legal system as a whole? The question is which agent’s mental state we
must ascertain in order to identify the object of punishment. We simply don’t know.
Nor do we know which types of mental state play the determinative role.
We won’t be in a position to know until we’ve resolved a further issue: how
should we understand the act of censuring? Is the act of censuring the
communication of censure to some intended audience, or is it instead the mere
expression of censure? “To express a mental state requires only that one manifest it
in speech or action,” explain Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes. 48 “To
communicate a mental state [by contrast] requires that one express it with the intent
that others recognize that state by recognizing that very communicative intention.” 49
If the censure in punishment is expressive rather than communicative, 50 the
punitive agent can censure an offender for a given wrong without ever meaning to
communicate that censure. As Anderson and Pildes observe, “[o]ne can express a
mental state without intending to communicate it. The shoplifter may express her
intention to get away with stealing a purse in her furtive glances. But she hardly
intends to communicate this intention.” 51 Likewise, the punitive agent may express
its disapproval of an offender’s extraneous (i.e., non-offense) misconduct through
its guiding preoccupation with that misconduct, whether or not it intends to express
its disapproval, and even if it intends not to. If the censure in punishment is purely
expressive, then what matters is the object of the reprobative attitude that the
punitive agent’s preoccupation in fact expresses, not the attitude (if any) that the
agent intends to express. This is true of expression generally. In complimenting the
appearance of a female co-worker, a businessman may not intend to express
disrespect—he may intend the opposite—but his compliment will express disrespect
nonetheless if it evinces the belief that women in a business setting are, as Anderson
and Pildes put it, “sexual or aesthetic adornments.” 52 In cases of mere expression,
the mental state that determines an act’s expressive content may be a mental state of
which the agent is unaware, or even a mental state that the agent intends to conceal.
If by contrast the censure in punishment is communicative rather than merely
expressive, then the punitive agent’s reprobative attitude isn’t what determines the
object of censure. What determines the object of censure is instead either the
48

Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1508 (2000) (emphasis added).
49

Id. (emphasis added).
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Feinberg defines punishment as “a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of
resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation.” Feinberg, supra note
37, at 98.
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Anderson & Pildes, supra note 48, at 1508.
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Id. at 1525.
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punitive agent’s “communicative intention” (roughly, what the speaker intends his
audience to understand by a given utterance), or the audience’s reasonable
understanding of the speaker’s communicative intention—or perhaps some
combination of the two. 53 Seemingly all theorists agree that the content of what a
speaker communicates by an utterance is never just a matter of the words he uses, 54
just as the content of what an actor expresses through an action isn’t a matter of what
he says while doing it. No one is a formalist about the communicative content of
assertive utterances, as no one is a formalist about acts’ expressive meanings. Nor
should anyone be a formalist about the communicative or expressive content of
criminal prosecutions. What legal officials say when they prosecute someone
doesn’t determine what they communicate or express by prosecuting him.
While there’s no consensus theory of the nature of the punitive agent or of the
nature of the act of censure, all extant theories of expression or communication
indicate uncertainty about the object of punishment. All such theories entail that the
content of the act of censure hinges on more than its formal features—on more than
the punitive agent’s explicit self-description. And nearly every theory of expression
or communication also entails that the precise meaning of the act of censure hinges
at least partly on the punitive agent’s mental states. I can imagine only one
53
See Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of
Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217, 230–31
(Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) (“There are different notions of communicative content.
One notion of communicative content—the neo-Gricean one, as I will call it—derives from the seminal
work of Paul Grice. According to the neo-Gricean notion, the communicative content of an utterance
is the content of a certain kind of complex intention [that I’ll call a communicative intention]. Roughly
speaking, for a speaker’s utterance of a sentence to have the communicative content that P is for the
speaker to utter the sentence intending his or her hearers to come to recognize that the speaker is
communicating P, in part by their recognition of this very intention. . . . By contrast, according to what
I will call an objective notion of communicative content, the communicative content of an utterance is
what a member of the audience would reasonably take a speaker who had uttered the relevant sentence
under specified conditions to have intended to communicate. . . . There are also hybrid notions. For
example, according to one notion, the communicative content of an utterance is that part of what the
speaker intended to communicate for which uptake by the audience could reasonably be expected.”).
54
Noting the “now widely recognized fact that what speakers mean generally goes beyond
sentence meaning,” Kent Bach observes that “it is now a platitude that linguistic meaning generally
underdetermines speaker meaning. That is, generally what a speaker means in uttering a sentence, even
if the sentence is devoid of ambiguity, vagueness, or indexicality, goes beyond what the sentence
means.” Kent Bach, Context ex Machina, in SEMANTICS VERSUS PRAGMATICS 15–16 (Zoltan Gendler
Szabo ed., 2015). See also id. at 26–27 (“[T]he semantic content of a sentence . . . always
underdetermines what a speaker means in uttering it. Here’s why. Even if what a speaker means
consists precisely in the semantic content of the sentence he utters and that content is precise, this fact
is not determined by the semantic content of the sentence. The reason for this claim is very simple: no
sentence has to be used in accordance with its semantic content. Any sentence can be used in a
nonliteral or indirect way. A speaker can always mean something distinct from the semantic content
of the sentence he is uttering. That he is attempting to communicate something, and what that is, is a
matter of his communicative intention, if indeed he has one. If he is speaking literally and means
precisely what his words mean, even that fact depends on his communicative intention.”).
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circumstance in which the punitive agent’s mental states play no role in fixing the
object of punishment. That’s the circumstance in which no legal actor exercises any
discretion about which individuals to charge, what crimes to charge them with, and
what sentences to impose. This circumstance exists only under the Code of Babel. 55
V.
I’ve argued that our uncertainty about the object of punishment stems from the
fact that legal punishment is an act of collective expression. But if legal punishment
is an act of collective expression, it’s one that’s drawn out and disjointed, with no
member of the collective clearly authorized to speak on its behalf. This complexity
might lead us to suspect that legal punishment qua expressive act isn’t really a single
act at all, but is instead a series of expressive acts that, taken together, lack a coherent
meaning.56 If that’s right, then we theoretically could conclude that no one is ever
punished for anything. The state imposes punishment only when it expresses
condemnation of a particular person for a particular wrong. But if the state is too
disjointed a collection of entities ever to function as a single collective agent
expressing a coherent message of condemnation, then it never expresses
condemnation of particular persons for particular wrongs: it never imposes
punishment.
That’s an absurd conclusion. So we should consider rejecting its unstated
premise: that, in order to impose punishment, the state must function as a single
collective agent expressing a coherent message of condemnation. The state in a
criminal prosecution is perhaps not one agent but a series of them, some individual,
some collective: the police officer who makes the arrest, the prosecutor and her
advisors and supervisors, the jury (if any), and the judge. From this conception of
the state qua punisher we might infer that a given prosecution involves two distinct
55
Against all this, one might assert the unorthodox claim that a punishment’s meaning is
entirely a function not of the tribunal’s intent but of the actual or expected understanding of that intent.
The claim is unorthodox because philosophers of language widely agree that an expressive act’s
meaning is at least sometimes a function of what’s going on in the speaker’s head. But what if
collective utterances were different? What if the meaning of a collective utterance, unlike that of an
individual one, were a function entirely of the audience’s understanding? It still would remain to be
determined how broadly we must define the relevant audience. It’s not obvious that the relevant
audience would be the public at large. If the relevant audience were instead the set of officials
connected in some fashion to the collective act, then the act’s meaning might remain elusive. But what
if the relevant audience were indeed the public at large? In that case, the object of an offender’s
punishment still might be something other than the nominal offense of conviction, but any such
discrepancy would be public rather than hidden. So we’d still be right to worry about whether our legal
system violates the rights it proclaims sacrosanct—and arousing this concern is this essay’s primary
goal—but we’d be wrong to fear that these violations occur more frequently than we recognize.
56
See Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 979, 979
(2017) (“Congress has no collective intention, not because of difficulties in aggregating the intentions
of individual members, but rather because Congress lacks the sort of delegatory structure that one finds
in, for example, a corporation.”).
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objects of criminal liability: one at the guilt/innocence stage and another at the
sentencing stage. If the object of punishment is determined partly by the mental
states of the relevant legal officials, then the wrong of which an offender is convicted
might differ from the wrong for which he’s sentenced.
If we embraced this bifurcation of the object of punishment, we could avoid
some of the concerns I raised earlier about how often defendants’ procedural rights
are given their due—but only if we were willing to understand the rights in question
as relativized to different stages of a prosecution. Consider the right not to be
punished for an offense unless charged, tried, and proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. If we understood this right as applying only at the guilt/innocence stage, we’d
conceive it as a right not to be deemed guilty of some offense unless charged with
and proved guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. So conceived, the right
wouldn’t ground a claim not to be sentenced for some offense unless charged with
and proved guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant properly
proved guilty of the charged offense would have no cognizable complaint if
subsequently punished both for the offense of conviction and for some extraneous
transgression proved (only) at the sentencing hearing (only) by a preponderance of
the evidence. We could understand the right to a proportionate punishment
similarly: not as the right to be punished in proportion to the gravity of the offense
of conviction, but (merely) as the right to be punished in proportion to the gravity of
the wrongdoing proved at the sentencing stage.
If we divorced “sentencing wrongs” from “guilt/innocence wrongs” in this way,
we’d reduce but not eliminate our uncertainty about whether defendants’ procedural
rights are given their due. We’d no longer have reason to worry about whether the
wrong targeted at the sentencing stage was the same as the wrong targeted at the
guilt/innocence stage: we’d accept from the outset that these wrongs often differ and
that their differing offends no right. But, thanks to prosecutorial discretion, we’d
still have reason to worry about whether the wrong targeted at the guilt/innocence
stage really was the wrong of which the defendant was charged and for which he
was tried. And, thanks to judicial discretion, we’d still have reason to worry about
whether the wrong targeted at the sentencing stage diverged from the nominal object
of sentencing.
Our biggest concern, however, would be the fact that divorcing “sentencing
wrongs” from “guilt/innocence wrongs” would portray the law of criminal
sentencing, if not the entire criminal process, as suffering from a kind of false
consciousness. On its face, sentencing law strives to ensure that penal sentences
punish offenders (only) for the wrongs of which they’re convicted: to ensure that
“sentencing wrongs” and “guilt/innocence wrongs” are identical. Consider, for
example, that criminal codes associate particular offenses with specific sentencing
ranges. This feature implies that the guilt/innocence stage of a prosecution isn’t an
intake valve, as the Divine Justice model supposes, but that the guilt/innocence stage
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serves instead to establish which wrong (or which general type of wrong57) a given
offender may be punished for.
Equally revealing is the line of Supreme Court cases requiring prosecutors to
prove at the guilt/innocence stage any fact that raises the maximum sentence or
triggers a mandatory minimum sentence. 58 The first of these cases, Apprendi v. New
Jersey, concerned a man who fired several shots into the house of his AfricanAmerican neighbors because he didn’t want black people in his neighborhood. 59
Apprendi pleaded guilty to a gun possession offense carrying a sentence of five to
ten years in prison. 60 The trial court then sentenced Apprendi to twelve years,
invoking a hate crime law that permitted enhanced sentences for crimes done with a
purpose to intimidate an individual or group because of their race.61 Apprendi
appealed his sentence and ultimately persuaded the U.S. Supreme Court that the
sentencing enhancement violated his right to a jury trial.62 The Court held that the
New Jersey hate crime law had punished Apprendi for a crime of which he hadn’t
been duly convicted:
New Jersey threatened Apprendi with [a] certain [punishment] if he
unlawfully possessed a weapon and with additional [punishment] if he
selected his victims with a purpose to intimidate them because of their
race. As a matter of simple justice, it seems obvious that the procedural
57
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safeguards designed to protect Apprendi from unwarranted [punishment]
should apply equally to the two acts that New Jersey has singled out for
punishment. Merely using the label “sentence enhancement” to describe
the latter surely does not provide a principled basis for treating them
differently. 63
In the Court’s view, New Jersey’s “sentencing enhancement” law employed the
nomenclature of a deceptive formalism, one that masked the state’s effort to punish
offenders for wrongs it hadn’t proved at the guilt/innocence stage. The Court
seemingly took for granted, as a bedrock principle, that the wrong for which a
defendant is sentenced must be the wrong of which he was convicted.
In theory, we could turn the tables on the Court’s view by branding its Apprendi
decision as nothing but a piece of deceptive formalism itself. We could insist that
all principles of sentencing law exist to mask the fact that our criminal legal system
actually operates on the Divine Justice model, the law of criminal liability serving
as little more than an intake valve. If that’s our criminal legal system, then the real
function of sentencing law is to put a filter over the valve—not for the purpose of
ensuring that offenders are punished only for the wrongs of which they’re convicted,
but instead for the purpose of bridling the state’s otherwise largely unbridled
discretion to act as an arbiter of divine justice. Many imaginable variations on our
existing sentencing law could serve this discretion-bridling purpose equally well. If
the point is to bridle discretion, what’s important is that there be some set of
regulatory principles. Their particular content is secondary.
If our criminal legal system covertly operates on the Divine Justice model, then
it’s not just sentencing law but criminal law across the board that suffers from a kind
of false consciousness. Our law of criminal liability appears to play what R.A. Duff
calls “a declaratory rather than [merely] prohibitory [role],”64 the law of crimes
serving “to declare that [certain] pre-legal wrongs are public wrongs: to declare, that
is, not merely that they are wrongs . . . but that they are wrongs that properly concern
the whole polity, which should call their perpetrators to public account through the
criminal courts.”65 But if our system covertly operates on the Divine Justice model,
then the penal law’s declaratory character is mere pretense. Albeit useful pretense:
there’s utility in the pretense that the penal law serves to mark out pre-legal wrongs
as worthy of collective condemnation. A criminal legal system speaking the
language of moral wrongs commands allegiance more cheaply than one relying
entirely on threats.
That could be the system we have. But I doubt it’s the system most legal
officials think we have, and that’s pretty solid evidence it’s not the system we have
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in reality. Officials’ beliefs about these matters are to a certain extent self-justifying,
provided it’s true (as I’ve argued) that the beliefs and other attitudes of the
participants in the criminal process help determine that process’s basic nature. Most
legal officials appear to believe that the penal law marks out certain pre-legal wrongs
as worthy of punishment, that the penal law consequently ought to constrain which
wrongs offenders are punished for, and that sentencing doctrines like the Apprendi
principle serve to ensure that these constraints function effectively.
At the same time, most legal officials also appear to believe that they’ve got
every right to deploy the penal law in service of goals that aren’t distinctively
punitive, such as deterrence and incapacitation. And most legal officials also appear
to believe that they’ve got every right to deploy the penal law for the sake of punitive
goals other than those nominally espoused by the specific laws they’re prosecuting
people under. Legal officials widely endorse maneuvers like prosecuting murderers
for tax evasion.
I don’t mean to imply that instrumental deployments of the penal law are
necessarily unjust. There’s no injustice in punishing a murderer for tax evasion
because he’s a murderer. What’s unjust is punishing a murderer for murder by
convicting him of tax evasion. And our system makes it difficult to tell these two
scenarios apart. That’s because our system is a hybrid: part Babel, part Divine
Justice. We enjoy the advantages of flexibility, but the discretion that makes
flexibility possible comes at a price: we don’t know—maybe can’t know—how
often our system dishonors the rights it proclaims sacrosanct.
VI.
An unapologetic and thoroughgoing instrumentalist about the penal law will call
the uncertainty I’ve been insisting on irrelevant. All that matters to a thoroughgoing
instrumentalist is whether an offender’s punishment befits his wrongdoing.
But that isn’t all that matters to the rest of us. Yes, it matters which punishment
an offender gets, but it also matters how he gets it. Even an avowed instrumentalist
about the penal law should blanch at framing a guilty man or punishing him extrajudicially. We don’t just want an offender to receive a punishment that befits his
wrongdoing. We want him to receive it through a proper legal mechanism. And
that means a public process of adjudication culminating in proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of the wrongdoing for which the offender’s punishment is being
imposed. Or at least that’s what a proper legal mechanism means if we take the
law’s claims about procedural justice at face value.
Now some will concede the intrinsic significance of procedure but admonish us
not to take the law’s specific claims about procedural justice at face value. They’ll
tell us we should look beyond the ideals we preach to the methods we practice, and
that we should acknowledge a principle that these methods reveal we accept
covertly: that wrongdoing can be a proper object of punishment if proved beyond a
reasonable doubt at a trial or if proved by a preponderance of the evidence at a
sentencing hearing.
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Yet no such over-lenient principle sits comfortably with our actual practices.
Our actual practices don’t sanction (even tacitly) the punishment of wrongdoing
unrelated to the wrongdoing proved at a trial or admitted at a guilty plea hearing. In
our system, a criminal conviction doesn’t serve as a gateway to a forum of divine
justice where an offender who’s been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
some offense or other may now be punished for any offense whatsoever. No such
gates-wide-open principle is a norm of our actual legal practices—even an
unacknowledged one.
If there’s an unacknowledged norm of criminal sentencing—one more stringent
than the gates-wide-open principle that says that a criminal conviction may serve as
a gateway to a forum of divine justice but more lenient than the law’s official view
that the wrongdoing for which punishment is imposed must be proved at trial beyond
a reasonable doubt—the unacknowledged norm of criminal sentencing is a limited
gateway principle. It’s a principle that says that wrongdoing proved only at the
sentencing stage may indeed be an object of punishment but only inasmuch as it
relates to wrongdoing proved at trial.
If we accepted this limited gateway principle as a true principle of political
morality, we could concede a key claim of this essay—that for all we know our legal
system often dishonors the adjudicative rights it proclaims sacrosanct—without
thereby conceding that our legal system perpetrates injustice. We’d see these
adjudicative rights as “merely” legal rights, rather than as moral ones. The only
adjudicative right we’d recognize as a moral right is one our system dishonors less
frequently: the right not to be punished for wrongdoing proved only at the sentencing
stage which bears no connection to wrongdoing proved at trial.
But problems beset even the limited gateway principle. One problem is how to
specify it: how must the wrongdoing proved at the sentencing stage relate to the
wrongdoing proved at trial if the former is to be a proper object of punishment? A
tempting answer is that the wrongdoing proved at the sentencing stage must relate
to the wrongdoing proved at trial by revealing the latter as worse than it would be in
isolation—as more wrongful, more harmful, or more culpable. But if we construe
the relation this way, we construe it to require that the wrongdoing proved at the
sentencing stage reveal the wrongdoing proved at trial as itself worthy of severer
punishment. And this construal points us back to the law’s official view, that the
only proper object of an offender’s punishment is the wrongdoing proved at trial.
Suppose for a moment that we manage to do something I suspect is impossible:
articulate a cogent sense of “relates” less restrictive than “reveals as worse” but
restrictive enough to impose a meaningful constraint on the kind of wrongdoing
punishable at the sentencing stage. Suppose, in other words, that we manage to
construct an intelligible and morally defensible limited gateway principle, a
principle midway between the law’s official view, that the only proper object of an
offender’s punishment is the wrongdoing proved at trial, and the gates-wide-open
principle, that a criminal conviction is a gateway to a forum of divine justice. What
will be our reward for constructing this principle? Our reward will be a difficult and
embarrassing pair of questions: Why isn’t our moderate and morally defensible
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principle the law? Why is this principle instead something legal actors conspire to
suppress?
These questions won’t arise if we take the law’s official view at face value—if
we accept that punishing someone for wrongdoing proved only at the sentencing
stage really is unlawful and unjust. Taking the law’s official view of these matters
at face value isn’t the same as taking a legal official’s self-description as accurate or
sincere. Nor is it the same as regarding the legal process’s formal features as
determining the true object of punishment. It’s instead a matter of regarding the
law’s avowed commitment to adjudicative rights as expressing a sound political
morality.

